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A collection of one or more devices, each described by its Digital Device Manual and reachable over
0. network, is a ConnectedSpace. The behavior of each device is expressed using an extended finite state
machine. A set of policies may be enforced on the ConnecledSpace to ensure its safe behavior. Such safety
policies are monitored and enforced by a safety controller. We show how a safety controller is synthesized by
expressing the ConnectedSpace and the safety policies using the Timed Transition Model (TTM) and the
Real-Time Temporal Logic (RTTL), respectively. The resulting behavior of the ConnectedSpace, enforced
by the safety controller, is guaranteed to Slltisfy the safety policies. The notions of policy relaxation and
safety ranking are novel to this work. The synthesis procedure is modified to incorpomte these two notions.
We present an experimental evaluation of the modified synthesis procedure. The experimental results show
that the synthesis procedure is scalable with respect to the number of devices, number of policies, and the
number of states of the finite state machines.
1 Introduction
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examples may be found in hospital and health-care environments. For example, the interference of an Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MID) device with a cardiac pacemaker is well known [20J. Such interference may even
be fatal [6J. It is possible to prevent such interactions by specifying and enforcing safety policies. The safety
policies specify rules that guarantee a safe behavior of the devices in the environment under consideration.
The ability to monitor and control the devices from an external source provides opportunities for automatic
control of the safety of the ConneetedSpace, and hence the environment. The safety policies, such as thO!:ie
listed in [16,1,19,3,17,18], may be used for the control. The ConnectedSpace may be viewed as a Real-Time
Discrete Event System (ROES). Control-theoretic concepts for RDES may then be used for synthesizing the
safety controller for ConnectedSpaces.
The theory of supervisory control of Discrete Event Systems (DES), based on a framework of automata
and formal languages, was proposed by Ramadge and Wonham [15, 14J. This theory (RW theory) may be
used to synthesize a controller when the DES and the control specifications are both modeled as generators of
formallanguagcs. The controller enforces the specifications on the DES. Ostroff [11, 12J proposed a framework
based on Timed Transition Model (TIM) and Real-Time Temporal Logic (RTIL) for synthesizing controllers
for RDES. Given an RDES modeled using TTM, and the control specifications expressed using RTTL, the
controller may be synthesized using the Controller Design Procedure (CDP) described in {lll_ It is important
to emphasize that these techniques employ a constT'Uctive approach in contrast to a verification-based approach
for synthesizing controllers. A constructive approach aims to synthesize a controller that is correct with re!:ipect
to a given criteria. In a verification-based approach, the controller is synthesized and then verified for its
correctness.
In this work we describe a constructive approach for synthesizing safety controllers for ConncctedSpaces,
using RTMjRTIL framework. The key contributions of this work arc: (a) an approach to express Connect-
edSpaccs and their safety policies in the TTMjRTIL framework, (b) _the notions of safety criticality rank
and policy relaxation duration, (c) modifications to CDP to accommodate safety criticality rank and policy
relaxation duration, and (d) an experimental evaluation of the proposed approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. ConnectedSpaces and Digital Device Manuals are
described in Section 2. Safety policies, safety criticality rank, and policy relaxation duration are described in
Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 show how ConnectedSpaces and safety policies can be expressed using TIM
and RTTL, respectively. A modified CDP and its application in synthesizing a safety controller are proposed
in Section G. The results of an experimental evaluation of the modified CDP is presented in Section 7. Possible
extensions of the work are discussed in Section 8.
2 ConnectedSpace and Digital Device Manuals
A ConnectedSpace is a collection of one or more devices reachable across a network. The behavior, functions,
and attributes of a device are specified as a Digital Device Manual (DDM) [21J. A device may carry either its
DDM or 0. pointer to the location of its DDM.
Formally, a ConnectedSpace is defined as as = {DJ,D2,. _. ,Dm } where each D, is a DDM. A DDM D is
given by (CSM,F,LS,O,A) where
• CSM is an augmented finite state nutomaton for the device. eSM is given by a 6-tuple (Q, E, 6, fl, qo, SD)
where Q = Qu U Qs is a finite set of states, E is a possibly empty set of events, 5: Q x E -+ Q is the
transition function, n : E -+ N' gives the cost associated with a tl'll.nsition, qo is the initial state of the
device, and SD; Q -+ string is the semantic description function. Qs is a non-empty set of states. Qu
is a non-empty set of states such that 'rfs E Qu, there is aTE E such that 8(s,T) E Qs' In practice,
Qu are the set of states that may potentially lead to an unsafe situation of es. Qs is the set of states
that are guaranteed not to lead to any unsafe sitnation. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that
fl gives the maximum time duration required to complete a transition.
















Figure 1: A DDM for a cardiac Pacemaker.

























Figure 2: A DDM for a Magnetic Resonance Imaging device.
fo : 0 ....... E must be defined by all devices i.e. 10 maps the fundionality of the device to an event of the
finite state machine.
• LS = {lo, tl , ... , lr} is a set of labels where each Ii, i = 1 ... r identifies a particular geographic location.
• 0 = {01, 02, ••. , ou} is the set of functions provided by the device. Invocation of 0;:, i = 1 ... u generates
an event 17 E E.
• A = {at, a2•... ,am,curState, curLoc} is the set of attributes. ai, i = 1 ... m are the attributes exported
by the device. Each ai is of some type type(a,). A contains two special attributes, curState E Q
and curLoc E LS, that must be exported by nil devices. The current state and location of the device
are obtained through curState and curLoc attributes, respectively. The type(curState) is Q, while the
type(curLoc) is LS. The initial values of curState and curLoc are set to go and la, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the DDM for a modified version of the cardiac Pacemaker described in [4]. The associated
table in Figure 1 shows the mapping between the functions provided by the device and the events that trigger
state transitions in the finite state machine. For example, when a user requests the Off function, the ThrnOff
event is generated. The event may cause a state transition in the finite state machine, thus changing the state
of the device. Figure 2 shows the DOM for an Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRl) device. The interference
of an MRl device with a Pacemaker is well known [16]. It is possible to find the coexistence of these devices,
for example, in an Imaging Room, in hospitals. These devices may be described using their ODM, and the
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Imaging Room itself may be modeled as a ConnectedSpace. Subsequent sections in this paper show how the
safety of the Imaging Room may be enforced using the safety policy listed in [161.
3 Safety Policies
The safe behavior of a ConncetedSpace is specified using a set of OIle or more safety policies. These safety
policies may already be available for different environments such as health care and hospitals [16]. The safety
policies for devices that may be found in and around a home arc also available [1]. Various analysis techniques
such ns those based on fault-tree, event-tree, and petri nets [7, 81 may be used to derive these policies. The
safety policies, when implemented correctly, govern the behavior of the ConnectedSpace with respect to safety.
A safety policy P is a 3-tuple given by P=(I,O,T) where I is a boolean expression in the attributes and
states of the devices in the ConnectedSpacc, °is an ordered list of labels that identify a device, and r E N.
The list ° consists of the labels Ci for those devices whose states occur in I. A label C; is associated with
device D i . ° is represented as <C1 ,C2 , •.. ,Ck> where SCR(P,D i ) < SCR(P, D i +1 ), i = 1 ... k -1. SCn:
P x CS ---> N defines the rank of a device w.r.t a policy P. SCR(P,Di) is the safety criticality mnkof D, w.r.t
P. The boolean expression I is a logical negation of a conjunctive clause formed using the Q ... states of one
or moTe devices. The value of I must always be true i.e. I is III invariant.
A safety policy P is violated when I remains false for a duration greater than T. r is the relaxation
durntion for P. r may be assumed to be in appropriate time units. As mentioned earlier, it is possible
that a ConnectedSpace is deployed in environments that differ widely on the desired safety criticality. These
environments may have varying safety requirements. For example, it is possible that a laboratory may require
a low safety criticality for certain policies Le. they may tolerate violations of these policies for a brief period.
Whereas, a health care unit may not tolerate any safety violation. Hence, it must be possible to specify and
enforce such a behavior. Also, the same type of a device might have varying safety criticality. The device's
safety criticality might depend on the environment. It may also depend on the individual policies that govern
the device's behavior. Hence, it is necessary to provide the ability to rank the various devices with respect to
their safety criticality.
The snfety criticality rank provides
• a means by which the safety criticality of the ConnectedSpace can be tuned by adjusting ~he criticality
of individual devices.
• a guide by which a less conservative controller may be synthesized Le. when a transition, by an higher
ranked device could potentially lead to a policy being violated, the controller, instead of disabling the
transition, may move one or more of the lower ranked devices to new states in order to enable the current
transition.
Consider the Imaging Room example described in Section 2. For such a ConnectedSpace, the safety policy
described in [16] may be specified as PMSAFE = -,(curStatepM = PACING A curStateMRl = IMAGING)
<PM,MRl>(25). The policy is interpreted as follows. The policy is violated when PM and the MRI device
are in PACING and IMAGING states, respectively. Also, PM has a higher safety criticality rank than MRI.
Hence, when the PM is in PACING, MRl must not be allowed to move to IMAGING. If MRI is already in
IMAGING and if there is a request to move PM to PACING, then the safety controller has the option of
temporarily moving MRI to a different state in order to permit the request. The safety controller may delay
this move by no more than 25 time units.
4 Expressing ConnectedSpaces Using TTM
A ConllectedSpace may be expressed using a TI'M [11, 12]. TI'Ms are based on state machines. The
transitions of the state machine are augmented with data and control variables. A guard condition may also
be specified for each transition. The delays and timeouts for euch transition are modeled using lower and upper
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Table 1: A timed tram;ition model of PM.
hT e, , , u,




TurnOn (ClLrStatcPM-OFF) [curStatcPM:IDLEj 0 t,
ToAAT (ClLrStatcPAf_IDLE) [curState.PM:REFRACT] 0 t,
Toldle (cltrStatcn,I REFRACT) [curSlate.PM:IDLE] 0 t,
Wait (curStatcPM_REFRACT) [curSlale.P.\f :WAITING] 0 t,
ASense (curStatcPlo,t WAITING) [curStalePM :PACING] 0 t,
ASenseTM (ClLrStatcPfo,t_ WAITIN G) [curStatepM :PACINGJ 0 t,
PulseWidth (ClLrSlatcPM PACING) [curStatepu:REFRACTj 0 t,





time bounds, respectively. A TTM M is given by a 3-tuple M = (V, e, T) where V is the set of variables
that define M, e is a boolean-valued expression over the variables in V that defines the initial values of the
variables, and T is the set of all transition of lvI. A transition rET is given by (e.. , h.. , l.. , u.. ) where e.. is the
enabling condition for r, h.. is the transformation function for the variables in V, i.. is the delay for r, and h..
is the deadline for r. In addition to the variables on M, V also contains a special variable n. n gives the next
transition for M.
Let GS = {D1 ,D2 , .•• ,D,.} be a ConnectedSpace where D i = (GSM;,F;,LSi,Oi,A i) and GSMj =
(Qj, E i , 6;, ni , qo,;, SD.). The procedure to express the ConnectedSpace as a TTM is as follows.
• Each D, E GS is expressed as a TTM M; = (V.. 6 i , 'Ii).
• Vi = {ak,ilak,. E Ad U {curStatei E Ai} U {curLoc; E Ai} where ak,; is attribute ak of device Di.
• 6 i = (n = initial, curStatei = qo,; E Qi, curLoc; = lO,i, al,i = alO,;, a2,i = a20,"··· ,ak" = akO,;) where
akO,; is the initial value of ak,i, and qO,i is the initial state qo of device D•.
• T = {rlr E E i } where e.. = vj=l(curStatei = q)Vq E Qi, and o;(q,r)!, h.. : curStatei = oi(q,r), l.. =
0, and u .. = n;(r).
The ConnectedSpace, which is the plant to be controlled, is then PLANT=(VPLANT, 6PLANT, TpLANT)
= (VI UV2U...UV,., 6 1A62 1\ •..A6,., 7i U12u...u'l;.). It is assumed that there are no shared transitions among
Eis. Hence, TpLANT is computed as the union ofT;s. Using the procedure listed, the DDM for PM described in
Section 2 may be expressed as follows. MpM "'" (VPM,6PM, TpM) where VPM = (n,curStatepM,curLocPM),
6 PM = (n = initial,cu1'StatePM = OFF,cu1'LocPM = io). TpM is shown in Table 1.
5 Expressing the Safety Policies using RTTL
Expressing the safety policies defined in Section 3 in RTTL is straightforward. This can be done by expressing
each policy Pk = (h, Ok, 1'k) as a control specification Sk d~ Oh. Thus, PMSAFE can now be specified as
S d~ O--,(curStatepM=PACING AcurStateMRl=IMAGING). Sk is interpreted as "henceforth h is true".
h is the unsafe state defined by Sk. Ok and rk are not specified in the control specification, but, instead,
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are incorporated in the actions taken by the controller. The CDP is appropriately modified to synthesize the
controller that enforces Ok and rk for each Pk·
6 Synthesis of the Safety Controller
Given the model of the plant as a TIM, and the control specifications in RTTL, a safety controller may be
synthesized using CDP [I1J. Based on the specifications, COP identifies the unsafe states of the plant. The
notions of partial weakest preconditions and partial strongest postconditions, are used to identify the transi-
tions from a safe state to an unsafe state. Such transitions are termed unsafe. To avoid an exhaustive search
in identifying the unsafe transitions, COP works backwards starting from the ullsafe state. The unsafe tran-
sitions are then made safe by disabling the transition or by forcing a safe transition. A controller synthesized
using COP is guaranteed to enforce the specifications.
Given a specification Sk d~ Oh, for each transition T E TpLANT, the safe state, Prebadr,PT,ANT, from
which the unsafe state h may be reached in a single step is computed. P7'ebadT,PLANT is defined us
PrebadT,PT,ANT = pwp(-r, wd. pwp(-r, Wk) is the partial weakest precondition, and is defined as pwp(-r, 1/Jk) =
eT A VJk where wk=h. Hence, -r is unsafe if Prebadr,PLANT exists i.e if PrebadT,PT,ANT is not false. Table 2
and Table 3 show P1'ebadT,MRJ and PrebadT,PM states for MRI and PM, respectively. As there are no shared
transitions among PM and MRI, the PrebadT,PLANT = PrebadT,MRJ U PrebadT,PM_ The procedure described
will result in two PrebadT,PLANT states: (a) (curBtatePr.f = PACING A curBtateMRJ = MOOESEL), and
(b) (curBtatepM = WAITING 1\ curStateMRJ = IMAGING).
After computing PrebadT,Pl,ANT, CDP may then be used to synthesize the controller. COP consists of
four different steps. Step 3 specifies two different strategies to handle a pending (unsafe) transition r:
• Rl: Change the enabling condition eT so that Prebad."PLANT is false.
• R2: Force the occurrence of a safe transition u prior to the occurrence of T. This strategy is applicable
only if Uu > iT' For ConnectedSpaces expressed using the procedure outlined earlier, Uu > in Vu'rh E
T'PLIINT. Hence, it is always possible to apply R2.
Step 3 is modified, to incorporate the safety criticality rank and the relaxation duration. The modification
to Step 3 ensures that each unsafe transition is made safe in a single step of the procedure. Hence, Step 4
of CDP is eliminated. The CDP modified for synthesizing safety controllers for ConnectedSpaces (CS-CDP) is
shown in Figure 3.
Step 3 of CS-CDP ensures that a transition r belonging to a higher ranked device is always enabled. In
order to ensure that T is enabled, the plant is moved to a safe state. During the process of moving to a safe
state, the relaxation duration r; of the current specification Si is used to determine if T can be forced first.
The effect of the modification may be illustrated using PMSAFE. Let Stop be the safe transition, and let the
maximum transition duration, tStop, be 20. In this case, ifMRI is currently in state IMAGING, and ASense is
requested, the controller will force ASense followed by Stop. When PM is in state PACING, and the transition
Start is requested, it will be denied (disabled). Hence, a higher ranked device, such as PM in the example,
will be allowed to function without hindrance while adhering to specifications.
The control actions computed using CS-CDP are used by the safety controller (SC) in the PrebadT,PLANT
states. se is also modeled as a finite state automaton. se is given by a (a) 4-tuple (Qsc, Esc, osc, qo) where
Qsc is the set of states, Esc is the set of events, osc is the transition function, and qo is the initial state of
Be, and (b) control table eT: Qsc x Esc --+ control action for SC. A control action may disable, enable
or a force one or more events. eT(q), q E Qsc, defines the action that must be taken by SC on receiving an
event T E Esc when SC is in state q. Be is obtained as a shuffle product [15] Le. Be = MdlJ'vI211 .. . liMn,
i = 1 ... n. The PrebadT,PLANT states in Be are then augmented with the control actions. The sa.fety
controller se for the Imaging Room example, without the self-loops due to MRILocCh and PMLocCh, would
have 14 states and 66 transitions. Each state qi E Qsc, i = 0, ... ,13 is·given by qi = (qj, q;:) where qj and q;:
are states of MRI and PM, respectively. The states qi E Qsc, i = 0, ... ,13 are shown in Table 5. The states
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Table 2: Computation of the PrebadT,plIf states.
Prebad.,.. PM pwp(r h)h,• • .




TumOn (curStatePM OFF) [curStatePM:IDLE] fal8e
ToAAT (curState pt,.f -IDLE) [curState pt,./ :REFRACTj fal8e.
Toldle (curStatePM REFRACT) [eurStatePM:IDLEj fa18e
Wait (eurStatePM-REFRAOT) [curSlatePM:WAITINGj fa18e
AScnse (eurStatePM WAITING) [curStalePM:PACINGj (eurStatePM WAITING
!lcurStoteM n /=IMAGING)
AScnseTM (curStatept,./-WAITING) [curStale.p M:PACJNGj (curStatePM -WAITING
!leurStateAl Til =IMAGING)
PulseWidth (curStatePM-PACING) [eurSlatePM:REFRACTj fa18e





Table 3: Computation of the Prebad.,.,MRT states.
I Prebad MR/ pwp(r h) Ih,• • ' . - •
Switchorr (curStateMRJ MODESELV [curStateMRJ:OFFj false
curStateMR/=IMAGING
SwitchOn (curStateMRI OFF) [curStateM RJ :MODESELj false
ToModel (curStateMRI_MODESEL) [curStateMR/:MODESELj fal8e
ToMode2 (curStateMRI MODESEL) IcurStateM RI:MODESELj fal8e
Start (curState", nr-MODESEL) [curStatcMRI:lMAGING] (curStatePM_PAClNG
eurStateMR/=MODESEL)
Stop (curStateMRI-IMAGING) [eurStatcMnJ:MODESELj fal8e





1. Check that 8PLANT is a safe state. If the check fails, then no additional control will achieve the required
specification. If the check succeeds, then proceed to the Step 2.
2. If every transition is safe, then the plant already satisfies the control specification. Hence, exit from the
procedure.
3. Mark every ummfe transition T as pending i.e. it is yet to bc made safe.
4. Make every pending transition safe as follows.
if SCR(Pk,Dj ) > SCR(Pk,Dk), T E Ej , (1 E Ek'
if (Tk;:::::t",)
then force transition T followed by (1. 1* Case 1: The ConnectedSpace is allowed to remain un-
safe for a maximum duration of Tk time units. *1
else force transition (1 followed by T. /* Case 2(a): The ConnectedBpace is not allowed to be
become unsafe. */
else disable T. /* GMe 2(b): Since the unsafe transition is requested on a device with a lower safety
criticality rank, the GonneetedSpace is prevented f1'Om becnming unsafe by denying (dis-
abling) the transition. */
Figure 3: Procedure CS-CDP for synthesizing safety controllers for ConnectedSpaces.
Table 4: The control table for the safety controller.
controller action,
q" ASense q" Stop enable T and then force (J
q" ASenseTM q" Stop enable T and then force (J
q" Start q" disable T
I q E Qsc I T E Esc I 8sc(q e) I U E Esc I
ql2 = (llvIAGING, WAITING) and q13 = (MODESEL, PACING) in SC correspond to the Prebad"PLANT
states. The control table and osc ate shown in Table 4, and Table 6, respectively. For brevity, the control
table only lists those states of SC where an event is either disabled or forced. When the controller is in the
states that are not specified in CT, it enables all events. Also, note that Case 1, Step 3 of CS-CDP ensures
that an unsafe state of the ConnectedSpace, and hence the controller, is transitory. Hence the (IMAGING,
PACING) state of the controller is not listed in Table 5. For example, when the controller is in state ql2
= (IMAGING, WAITING) and ASense transition is requested, the controller moves to state (MODESEL,
PACING) through state (IMAGING, PACING). Hence, OSC(QI2, ASense) will be q13'
7 Experimental Evaluation
CS-CDP and the procedure for computing the Prebad..,PLANT states were implemented in C++ using the
LEDA [9jlibraries. The implementation was used to experiment wIth CS-CDP. The experiments were conducted
on a Pentium-III machine, with 256MB of RAM, operating at 700MHz, and running the Linux operating
system.
Consider a ConnectedSpace CS={D1 , D2, ... , Dm} where D j , i = 1 ... m is the DDM for device Di . Let
SP={Pl,P2, ... Pn} he the set of safety policies imposed on CS. The size of a ConnectedSpace is specified by
the number of policies n = ISPI, and the number of devices m = ICS!. ConnectedSpnces are classified, based
on their size, as (a) small, (b) medium, (c) large, and (d) huge. The set of safety policies is cllatacterized
8
















I q, E Qsc I (q'. q;)
f; C(P,)
using the notion of density. The density d of SP is defined as d = '-~~m where C : SP_ N is a function
that gives the number of unique devices whose states or attributes occur in a policy.
f; IQ,I
The average number of states s in the finite state machines is defined as s = i=lm where Qi is the set
of states for Di - The CPU usage, in milliseconds, for computing the PrebarLr,PLANT states and for executing
CS-CDP, are denoted by Tprobad and T es_cop , respectively. The total CPU usage TtouJ. for synthesizing the
safety controller is the sum of Tprabod and T es_cop .
For ~ach of the four classes of ConnectedSpaces, experiments were conducted to study the following:
• Tne impact of nand m on Tcotftl .
• The impact of d on T~otftl.
• The impact of s on T totftl .
For each class of ConnectedSpace, representative values for n, m, d, and s are chosen. These values are
used to generate SP uniformly at random. The extended finite state machine CSM; for device D; E CS,
i = 1 ... m is generated as follows.
• The set of states Qi = {Q8 U Qu} E CSM; is generated such that JQil = sand IQ81 = l.
• The set of events E; E CSM, is generated such that IE,I = n(n - 1).
• The state transition function 0; E CSlvJ; is generated such that (a) there is a transition from each state
in Qu to every state in Q8' (b) there is a transition from each state in Q8 to every state in Qu, and
(c) there is a transition from each state in q E Q" to every other state in Qll.' Each TEE triggers exactly
one transition.
• The cost function 0;; E CSM, is generated such that 0(7) = 500, &(q,T) E Q8' q E Qll. i.e. a maximum
duration of 500 time units is assigned to every tronsition from a state in Qll. to a state in Q8' For all
other transitions, a duration in [1,80) time units is assigned uniformly at random.
• The initial state qo,;; of D, is the state in Q8.
9
Table 6: The transition function for the safety controller.





"" ToModol ".. ToModo~ .... TIl,,,O,, ..
" 5"I«hO" .." Tu<oOIf "., ToAAT ..
" 5'01' ""
5w1l01,Orr
'"" TumOn .... 5,,1<01,011 "" Tu",O" .." T"Modot .... ToMod.2 ..
" Tu,,,Off ".. ToAAT "" Swl«bOn .,., TumOrr ".. T~ldlo "" W",I<lol< .," Slop .... S ..U"Ioorr ".. T,,<nOrr ".. TnAAT ..
"









I q E Qsc I o E :!;sc I ~"c(q. oj I., WAlLing ..,.. SwlLcbO" ",
"
.,.,,.,,orr >... Toldl" ".. ASoo," '".. ASoo",TJo.! ",
" S'op
.,.. s,.l«hOJr ".. n"nOrr ".. Toldlo '"., W",I,I"I ",.., 5wll<bO'J ..
.w S<A« ..,
.W ToModol '".., ToModo~ "..., Tl,."OJf ..
"0 To!dl, ".., AS"lo.o ",.., ASon'cTM ..,
", S..lt"bolf '"." TumOlr '".., Told!o ."
'" P"I.owM,b ".., ASon... ..,.., ASo"...TM q!~
." Stop ..,." S",I,cbOfJ .,." Tl""OJI >,", Toldl. ..", Star< .".., S .. ILcl,OJl 'n
q,~ ToJo.'odo' ..,
", ToJo.lodo2 ",.., Told!• ..
0 P"I,cWldLl, >
A single run of the experiment consists of executing CS-CDP for (a) d = 0.1,0.2, ... ,1, and (b) 5 =
5,10,15, ... ,40, for each class of ConnectedSpace. Values of Tprebad and TCS- CDP are collected for each run.
The value of T~"tftl is then computed using the average values of Tprebad and TCS_CDP over 10 runs of the
experiment.
Table 7 shows the representative values of n, m, 5, and Ttotal for d = 0.5, for each of the four classes.
As may be observed from Table 7, the total CPU usage increases linearly with increase in the size of the
ConnectcdSpace.
The impact of the number of devices and the number of policies on the Tton.1 are shown in Figure 4 and
Figure 5, respectively. As may be observed from the figures, the total CPU usage increases linearly with
increasing number of devices and policies.
The impact of d and s on Tto~al are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, respectively. The figures show that
T totftl increases linearly with respect to both d and 5.
Table 7: The characteristic values of n, m, 5, and T~o~ftl for each of the four classes of ConnectedSpaces for
d~ 0.5.
CPU usage for synthesizing
No. of policies No. of devices Average no. of states the safety controller (milliseconds)
n m , T totftl
small 5 20 20 0.541
medium 25 100 20 19.139
large 125 700 20 726.65
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Figure 5: The effect of the number of policies n on the total CPU usage Ttotll1 for Tn = 700.
11
1000










0.1 02 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Density
0.7 0.8 0.9
Figure 6: The effect of density d on the total CPU usage Ttotlll for s = 20.
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Figure 7: The variation of the total CPU usage Ttotal with respect to the average number of states of the
finite state machines for d = 0.5.
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8 Future Work
ConnectedSpaces and Digital Device Manuals arc described in the paper. The notions of safety criticality rank
and policy relaxation duration were introduced. The approach for applying the TIM/R'ITL framework in
the synthesis of a safety controller for ConnectedSpuces is described. A sample ConnectedSpace in a hospital
environment is used to Hlustrate the approach. An experimental evaluation of the synthesis procedure is also
presented. The experiments show that the procedure is scalable with respect to the number of devices, number
of policies, and the number of states of the finite state machines.
A ConnectcdSpace may he highly dynamic in nature. For example, it is possible that the number and type
of devices may change over time. In addition, the safety policies may also change. In such cases, thc controller
may have to bc !:iyntbcsized dynamically. Though the approach described in this paper is scalable, yet tbe
time to compute the safety controller may not be acceptable in such ConnectedSpaces. Hence, an approach.
for the incremental synthesis of the safety controller may be needed. It may be possible to apply the modular
synthesis approach presented in [13]. The issues involved in the development of an incremental approach for
the controller synthesis need to be investigated.
In the control of critical properties such as safety, the fault-tolerance of the controller itself is crucial.
The issues involved in the dynamic, automated synthesi!:i of safety controHers, that are correct as well as
fault-tolerant, need to be studied.
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